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TRANSSEXUALS IN SEARCH OF LEGAL
ACCEPTANCE: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE CHROMOSOME TEST*
An exceedingly important objective of transsexuals who
have undergone a sex-change operation is to be legally accept-
ed as members of the sex they purport to be. The greatest
obstacle to their legal acceptance is the chromosome test, a
test which determines that transsexuals are members of the
sex to which they belonged at birth. This Comment sets a
factual background of transsexualism and sex determination
and then discusses the constitutionality of the use of the
chromosome test to determine a transsexual's sex.
A transsexual is a person who believes that he' is a member of the
opposite sex and attempts to become a member of that sex.2 Perhaps
the most significant legal aspect of transsexualism is that after
undergoing sex reassignment surgery,3 a transsexual usually seeks
* The author wishes to thank Professor Paul Wohlmuth of the University of
San Diego School of Law and Dr. Renee Richards for their invaluable help.
1. The use of he when referring to a transsexual will denote both the male
transsexual (born female, male after surgery) and the female transsexual (born
male, female after surgery). The word transsexual will denote a post-opera-
tive transsexual.
2. Money, Sex Reassignment, 9 INT'L J. PSYCH. 249, 251 (1970-71). Harry
Benjamin is considered one of the true pioneers in the field of transsexualism.
He coined the phrase "transsexual." His work, H. BENJAMIN, THE TRANSSEXUAL
PHENOMENON (1966) [hereinafter cited as H. BENJAMIN] is one of the leading
publications in this area. Other influential researchers and their works are R.
GREEN, SEXUAL IDENTITY CONFLICT IN CHILDREN AND ADULTS (1974); J. MONEY &
A. ERHARDT, MAN AND WOMAN AND Boy AND GIRL (1972); R: STOLLER, SEX AND
GENDER (1968); R. STOLLER, THE TRANSSEXUAL EXPERIMENT (1973); TRANSSEXUAL-
ISM AND SEX REASSIGNMENT (R. Green & J. Money eds. 1969) [TRANSSEXUALISM
AND SEX REASSIGNMENT is hereinafter cited as Green & Money]. See generally
Comment, The Law and Transsexualism: A Faltering Response to a Concep-
tual Dilemma, 7 CONN. L. REv. 288 (1975); Comment, Transsexualism, Sex
Reassignment Surgery, and the Law, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 963 (1971); Note,
Transsexual in Limbo: Search for a Legal Definition of Sex, 31 MD. L. REV. 236
(1971). These Notes and Comments discuss transsexualism in general and iden-
tify the various areas in which the transsexual has had and may have difficulty
with the law. For a more detailed discussion of transsexualism, see notes 14-37
and accompanying text infra.
3. Sex reassignment surgery is the surgical procedure whereby a person
who is anatomically one sex is given the anatomical features of the opposite sex.
legal acceptance as a member of his new4 sex5. For example, a trans-
sexual may seek to have his name6 and sex designation changed on
public documents such as his birth certificate, or he may contract a
purported marriage with a member' of the opposite sex.7
A number of recent cases involve transsexuals' quest for legal
acceptance of their new sex in the marriage and public documents
It is also commonly referred to as a sex change operation. For an explanation of
the surgical procedure, see Hoopes, Operative Treatment of the Female Trans-
sexual, in Green & Money, supra note 2, at 313-22; Jones, Operative Treatment
of the Male Transsexual, in id., at 335-52.
4. Throughout this Comment, original sex will refer to the sex that the
transsexual was born a member of, while new sex will refer to the sex of the
transsexual after sex reassignment surgery. It will be argued below that the
transsexual's "sex" changes when he undergoes the proper sex reassignment
procedures. Thus, the term new sex is utilized to emphasize that the transsexu-
al's sex after surgery is the opposite of that before surgery.
5. The transsexual has always believed himself to be a member of the oppo-
site sex. Pauly, Adult Manifestations of Female Transsexualism, in Green &
Money, supra note 2, at 86. Following surgery, the transsexual has the physical
appearance of his new sex and wants to be treated in society as a member of that
sex.
6. After sex reassignment surgery, the transsexual invariably changes his
name to one more common to his new sex.
7. The highly publicized Renee Richards controversy is yet another example
of a transsexual in search of legal acceptance. Dr. Richards, a female transsexu-
al, has been seeking the right to participate in women's professional tennis.
Originally Dr. Richards had no intention of playing professional women's ten-
nis. Dr. Richards underwent sex reassignment surgery in August, 1975, and had
her public documents changed to conform to her new name (she was formerly
Richard Raskind) and her new sex. After winning a tennis tournament in La
Jolla, California, on July 10, 1976, it became known that she was a transsexual.
This created quite a controversy. Some people felt that she had an unfair
advantage over other women because she had been born a man. Dr. Richards
began to receive hundreds of letters from transsexuals, many of them desper-
ate, seeking help. After giving the matter a great deal of thought, she realized
that she had an opportunity to help other transsexuals. She gave up her practice
as an ophthalmologist and attempted to play professional women's tennis. The
Women's Tennis Association and United States Tennis Association would not
allow her to play in women's professional tournaments which they operated, on
the ground that she was not a woman. They required Renee to pass the chromo-
some test (see note 9 infra) before she could participate. Finally in August, 1977,
after a long and frustrating struggle, Dr. Richards took her case to court where
it was ruled that she must be allowed to play in the United States Open Tennis
Tournament. Richards v. United States Tennis Ass'n, No. 14643/77 (N.Y. County
Sup. Ct. Aug. 25, 1977). Dr. Richards is now participating in the women's profes-
sional tennis tour.
Although a controversy over sex in the sports context is far less likely to occur
than a dispute as to acceptance of sex in the marriage or birth certificate
contexts, it is nevertheless significant. The Renee Richards controversy sym-
bolizes the ultimate goal of the transsexual, total acceptance in society as a
member of her new sex. Dr. Richards has repeatedly emphasized that what she
is fighting for is the right of a transsexual to be legally accepted as her new sex
in any situation. Interview with Renee Richards in La Costa, California (Oct. 15,
1976).
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contexts.8 Denial of a transsexual's membership in his new sex has
always been based on a finding that because of his chromosome
pattern,9 he should be legally classified as a member of his original
sex. In these cases, however, the transsexual did not argue that his
constitutional rights were violated by the use of the chromosome
test.10 The constitutional argument is an important one because if
classification by chromosomes is declared unconstitutional when ap-
plied by the state to the transsexual, then the transsexual would gain
an important victory in his quest for legal acceptance as a member of
his new sex.
This Comment will address the question whether basing a person's
legal rights on the results of the chromosome test" is an unconstitu-
tional violation of a transsexual's right to equal protection. 12 The
8. Darnell v. Lloyd, 395 F. Supp. 1210 (D. Conn. 1975); MT. v. J.T., 140 N.J.
Super. 77, 355 A.2d 204 (1976); Hartin v. Director of Bureau of Records &
Statistics, 75 Misc. 2d 229, 347 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1973); In re Anonymous, 57 Misc. 2d
813, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1968); K. v. Department of Human Resources, 26 Or. App.
311, 552 P.2d 840 (1976); Corbett v. Corbett, (Ashley), [1970] 2 All E.R. 33.
9. Chromosome patterns are often used to determine sex because males
have an XY chromosome pattern while females have an XX chromosome pat-
tern. The chromosomal sex is determined at the moment of conception, when
fertilization takes place. If the father's sperm cell carries a Y chromosome when
it enters the, mother's egg, the fetus usually develops as a male. If the father's
sperm cell carries an X chromosome, then the fetus will usually develop as a
female. The mother's egg cell almost always carries an X chromosome. H.
BENJAMIN, supra note 2, at 5.
The most common chromosome test used is the buccal smear, which consists
of analyzing a small amount of skin scraped from the inside of a person's mouth.
Moore, The Development of Clinical Sex Chromatin Tests, in THE SEX CHROMO-
TIN 173 (K. Moore ed. 1966). The purpose of this test is to analyze a person's cells
in order to determine his chromosome pattern. Id. at 179. The chromosome test
actually involves analyzing the sex chromotin of an individual. Sex chromotin is
a characteristic mass of chromotin found within nuclei of somatic cells of
normal females. It is the sex chromotin that represents an X chromosome. Id. at
1.
Chromosome pattern is one of approximately five biological criteria that
contribute to determining a person's sex. In this Comment, the term chromo-
some test or pattern will be synonymous with these biological criteria. The term
chromosome test is chosen instead of the term biological criteria because of the
general familiarity with the chromosome test.
10. In this Comment, a determination of sex by chromosome pattern will be
scrutinized. It does not matter whether the state in fact administers the chromo-
some test so long as it determines sex on the basis of chromosomes.
11. This question applies also to any other test which considers only biologi-
cal criteria of sex. See note 9 supra.
12. This Comment will assume that state action exists in the marriage and
birth certificate contexts. State action can be very present in the sports context
as well. The first tournament Dr. Richards won was played on public tennis
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constitutionality of the chromosome test will be examined in the
marriage and birth certificate contexts.'
3
TRANSSEXUALISM AND SEX DETERMINATION
Before analyzing the constitutional rights of the transsexual, a
factual background of transsexualism and sex determination must be
set forth. Until recently, when- the transsexual phenomenon first
raised the question 6f what determines a person's sex, it was simply
assumed by most people that a person is born either male or female.
In truth, however, there are many variables or criteria of sex that
cause a person to become one sex or the other. John Money lists
seven. 4 The first five criteria of sex are biological or physiological
while the last two are psychological. The five biological factors in-
clude the chromosome pattern, the presence of ovaries or testes,
hormonal differences, the internal organs of reproduction, and the
external sex organs. The two psychological factors are the sex that
the individual is assigned at birth and psychosexual or gender iden-
tity.
In the great majority of people, these various criteria of sex are in
harmony.'5 A normal' 6 person's sex could accurately be determined
by focusing on any of the indicators of sex. Thus, for the average
.person, an XX chromosome pattern will signify that the person is a
female. However, in some individuals, 7 the various criteria of sex are
courts and run by the San Diego, California, City Parks and Recreation Depart-
ment.
13. Although the marriage and birth certificate contexts are focused on, it is
hoped that the arguments urged here would apply in any situation in which the
state has classified on the basis of sex and then used the chromosome test to
define sex. The birth certificate context was chosen as an area of focus because
it is consistently the first and most important document the transsexual seeks to
have changed. However, this analysis could be applied to other public docu-
ments amendments, such as drivers' licenses and social security cards.
Several interesting questions not analyzed here arise in the sports context, as
exemplified by the Renee Richards controversy. One of these is whether a
female transsexual has an unfair athletic advantage over other females by
virtue of being born a male. Renee Richards argues fervently that any advan-
tage she may have had is lost after undergoing the sex reassignment surgery
and procedures because she now has female hormones (for the most part) rather
than the male hormone androgen. It is androgen that accounts for the greater
strength in men. Interview with Renee Richards in La Costa, California (Oct. 15,
1976).
14. Money, The Sex Chromotin and Psychosexual Differentiation, in THE
SEX CHROMOTIN (K. Moore ed. 1966). Other experts in this area have concluded
that there are even more than seven variables which determine sex. See H.
BENJAMIN, supra note 2, at 5-9 (nine variables); D. FEDERMAN, ABNORMAL SEXUAL
DEVELOPMENT 194 (1967) (nine variables).
15. H. BENJAMIN, supra note 2, at 10.
16. The word normal represents a statistically normal person.
17. As to how common anomalies of sexual differentiation are in the general
population, there are an estimated 10,000 transsexuals in the United States. H.
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not in harmony. For example, a person with an XX chromosome
pattern, who is normally female, may have one or more criteria of sex
that are characteristically male. Using only one sex criterion as
determinative of such a person's overall sex may be misleading and
erroneous.
An example of a person exhibiting dissonance among his various
criteria of sex is the condition known as androgen insensitivity or
testicular feminization. In this biological anomaly of sexual differ-
entiation a person is born with the traditionally male XY chromo-
some pattern. However, in such a person the cells of the body do not
respond to the male hormone androgen. The cells of the body do
respond, however, to the hormone estrogen, which, although pro-
duced in everyone, is ordinarily associated with females. As a result,
the other criteria of sex of such a person will develop as female. Thus,
the androgen insensitive person has a vagina, appears externally to
be female, is raised as a female, and believes herself to be a female.18
There are numerous other examples of biological anomalies of sexual
differentiation in which the various criteria of sex are in disso-
nance.
19
Transsexualism is another example of a person exhibiting disso-
nance among his various kinds of sex. However, transsexualism is a
psychological anomaly of sexual differentiation. The transsexual typ-
ically is morphologically and physiologically normal.20 However, he
harbors, with constant and persistent conviction, the desire to be-
BENJAMIN, supra note 1, at 12. One in 5,000 persons surviving birth have Tur-
ner's Syndrome, three in 1,400 males have Klinefelter's Syndrome, and one in
45,000 males have XX chromosomes. Polani, Errors of Sex Determinance and
Sex Chromosome Anomalies, in GENDER DIFFERENCES: THEIR ONTOGENY AND
SIGNIFICANCE (C. Dunsted and D. Taylor eds. 1972).
18. D. FEDERMAN, ABNORMAL SEXUAL DEVELOPMENT 105-11 (1967); J. MONEY,
SEX ERRORS OF THE BODY 32 (1968).
19. Hermaphroditism is probably the best known anomaly of sexual differ-
entiation. The hermaphrodite has some of the sexual characteristics of each sex.
D. FEDERMAN, ABNORMAL SEXUAL DEVELOPMENT 58-66 (1967); J. MONEY, SEX
ERRORS OF THE BODY 37-45 (1968). Examples of other anomalies of sexual differ-
entiation are Turner's Syndrome, D. FEDERMAN, ABNORMAL SEXUAL DEVEL-
OPmENT 42-57 (1967); J. MONEY, SEX ERRORS OF THE BODY 19 (1968), Klinefelter's
Syndrome, D. FEDERMAN, ABNORMAL SEXUAL DEVELOPMENT 27-41 (1967); J.
MONEY, SEX ERRORS OF THE BODY 17, (1968), males with XX chromosomes, U.
MiTTWOcH, GENETICS OF SEX DIFFERENTIATION 146-48 (1973), gonadal dysgenesis,
C. DEWHURST & R. GORDAN, THE INTERSEXUAL DISORDERS 10-11, 116-120 (1969); U.
MITTWOCH, GENETICS OF SEX DIFFERENTIATION 150-51 (1973), and females with
XY chromosomes, C. DEWHURST & R. GORDAN, THE INTERSEXUAL DISORDERS 120
(1969).
20. J. MONEY, SEX ERRORS OF THE BODY 86 (1968).
come a member of the opposite sex, and he progressively takes steps
to become and live in society as a member of the opposite sex.21 The
pre-operative transsexual's psychosexual sex or gender identity is
"at war" with his other criteria of sex. The cause of this condition is
unknown.
22
Because most people's criteria of sex are in harmony, it is difficult
for them to understand and empathize with the transsexual's dilem-
ma. Nevertheless, it is important for society and the legal system to
recognize that the transsexual who undergoes the proper sex reas-
signment procedures should be regarded as a person with a genuine
conviction that he is of the opposite sex.2 1 Six facts substantiate this
proposition.
First, the number of transsexuals is not insignificant. One estimate
is that there are 10,000 transsexuals in the United States,24 including
both pre-operative and post-operative transsexuals.
Second, experts in transsexualism have concluded in every report-
ed case that treatment in the sense of trying to cure transsexuals of
their conviction that they are members of the opposite sex is futile.25
21. Money, Sex Reassignment, 9 INT'L J. PSYCH. 249, 251 (1970-71). Money, in
his definition, says that the transsexual desires and takes steps to live in the
opposite sex role. However, Money's definition is not broad enough. The trans-
sexual seeks more than to live the role of the opposite sex, he seeks to become a
member of the opposite sex.
22. H. BENJAMIN, supra note 2, at 71-82; R. GREEN, SEXUAL IDENTITY CONFLICT
IN CHILDREN AND ADULTS, 36-48 (1974); Cravitz, Treatment of the Transsexual
and Medicolegal Issues, 7 FORENSIC SCI. 1, 4 (1976). Transsexualism has been
variously attributed to both biological and environmental factors.
23. There is a need to establish the credibility of the transsexual's condition.
Most people do not take the transsexual's condition seriously. It has been this
writer's experience that with the exception of those who are familiar with
transsexualism, most people regard the transsexual as a "freak" and tend to
joke about his condition.
Homosexuals have also been the recipients of scorn and ridicule in the past.
However, as the homosexual predilection has become increasingly publicized
and understood, it has been taken more seriously, with the result that pleas for
more humane treatment of homosexuals have been made. See Note, The
Avowed Lesbian Mother and Her Right to Child Custody: A Constitutional
Challenge that Can no Longer be Denied, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 799, 814-15
(1975). It is important for the transsexual that a parallel development occur in
the case of transsexualism.
24. Wall St. J., Jan. 28, 1977, at 1, col. 1. There are about three to four times
more female transsexuals than male transsexuals. Pauly, Adult Manifestations
of Female Transsexualism, in Green & Money, supra note 2, at 85. In its first
three years of operation, the Johns Hopkins Gender Identity Clinic received
1,500 applications for sex reassignment surgery. Money, Sex Reassignment, 9
INT'L J. PSYCH. 249, 266 (1970-71).
25. H. BENJAMIN, supra note 2, at 14. "Psychotherapy with the aim of curing
transsexualism ... is a useless undertaking with present available methods.
The mind of the transsexual cannot be changed in its false gender orientation,
All attempts to this effect have failed." Id. at 91. See also Montague, Transsex-
ualism, 2 UROLOGY 1, 5 (1973).
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There is general agreement that the only successful way to treat a
pre-operative transsexual is to perform sex reassignment surgery.
26
As a whole, transsexuals have been better adjusted after their sex
reassignment surgery than before.2 7 These facts lend force to the
argument that the transsexual should be regarded as having a valid
conviction that he is a member of his new sex.
Third, most transsexuals report that they have had the conviction
of being the other sex as long as they can remember.28 This fact gives
more credibility to the transsexual as someone with a valid convic-
tion rather than a condition that initially manifested itself at all ages.
Fourth, the sex reassignment procedure that a transsexual normal-
ly undergoes is extensive. Proper treatment of a transsexual who
wishes to change sex consists of three phases. 29 In phase one, after
determining that his patient is a genuine transsexual,30 the doctor
will administer hormones of the desired gender to the transsexual.
The transsexual will cross-dress and attempt to "pass" in society as a
member of his new sex. The goal of phase one is to test the ability of
the transsexual to adjust to the demands of his new sex role. This
phase usually lasts for at least one year.31 If the transsexual responds
favorably to phase one, then the phase two sex change operation is
performed. Finally, in phase three, the transsexual maintains his new
26. Hastings, The Surgical Route, 9 INT'L J. PSYCH. 273,274 (1970-71). Because
of the difficulties in constructing a penis, experts are more hesitant to suggest
surgery for the female to male transsexual. R. GREEN, SEXUAL IDENTITY CON-
FLICT IN CHILDREN AND ADULTS 132 (1974).
27. H. BENJAMIN, supra note 2, at 126. Benjamin points out that transsexuals
are not free from emotional and psychological problems as a result of sex
reassignment procedures, but they do appear to be better off after the proce-
dures than before. Accord, Pomeroy, Transsexualism and Sexuality: Sexual
Behavior of Pre- and Post-operative Male Transsexuals, in Green & Money,
supra note 2, at 188; Randell, Pre-operative and Post-operative Status of Male
and Female Transsexuals, in Green & Money, supra note 2, at 380-81.
28. Pauly, Adult Manifestations of Female Transsexualism, in Green &
Money, supra note 2, at 86.
29. Crovitz, Treatment of the Transsexual and Medicolegal Issues, 1 FOREN-
sic Sci. 1, 2 (1976). See also H. BENJAMIN, supra note 2, at 92.
30. The potential transsexual is thoroughly evaluated before treatment in
order to insure that he is truly a transsexual and that sex reassignment surgery
is the best course for him. Crovitz, Treatment of the Transsexual and
Medicolegal Issues, 1 FORENSIC SCI. 1, 2 (1976).
31. Id. The importance of this stage is illustrated by the fact that at the
Gender Dysphona Clinic at Stanford University, only 25% of those who begin
the program receive the operation. Many potential transsexuals drop out upon
discovering they are not truly transsexuals or because the clinic does not believe
surgery is in their best interest. Id.
sex status for life. The treatment team assesses his adjustment for
years to come and possibly for the remainder of his life. Thus, a
transsexual is not someone who simply undergoes sex reassignment
surgery. To qualify as a transsexual, the individual not only must
have had a constant and persistent conviction that he is a member of
the opposite sex, but he also must have undergone the procedures set
forth above.3 2
Fifth, the post-operative transsexual appears, behaves and func-
tions in society as a member of his new sex. Particularly important in
the marriage context is the transsexual's ability to perform sexually.
"Post-operatively, transsexuals are able to have satisfactory sexual
relations as members of their newly reassigned sex. ' 33 However, both
the male and female transsexual are permanently sterile after the sex
change operation.
34
Finally, the dichotomy between male and female is not absolute. In
fact, there is a spectrum of sexuality ranging from predominantly
male to predominantly female.3 5 For example, although estrogen is
commonly associated with the development of female sexual charac-
teristics, males also produce a small amount of estrogen in their
bodies. For this reason a male who is not able to respond to the male
hormone androgen will develop as female. 36 One commentator ex-
plains that "it can well be said that, actually, we are all 'intersexes,'
anatomically, as well as endocrinologically. But we are male or
female in the anatomical or endocrinological sense, according to the
predominant structures or hormones.1 37 Once it is understood that
every person is to some degree part of both sexes, it is clear that a
person's gender identity may be discordant with his biological
criteria of sex.
The court should seriously consider these six facts about transsex-
uals. It must understand the legitimacy of the transsexual's convic-
tion that he is a member of the opposite sex when adjudicating his
legal rights.
32. These procedures cost approximately $8,000 for a female transsexual at
the Stanford University Gender Dysphona Clinic. Id.
33. J. MONEY, SEX ERRORS OF THE BODY 87 (1968). For the female transsexual,
sexual relations continue to be pleasurable, and the transsexual maintains the
capacity to reach sexual climax. The constructed vagina is basically the same as
a natural vaginia in size, capacity, and sensitivity. In the male transsexual, there
is some difficulty constructing a functioning penis. The constructed penis
cannot become erect and needs to rest on some form of support to ensure
penetration into his partner's vagina. Nevertheless, the female to male transsex-
ual is also capable of orgasm. Id. at 87-88.
34. Green & Money, supra note 2, at 284.
35. Kennedy, Transsexualism and Single SexMarriage, 2 ANGLO-AM. L. Rev.
112, 113-14 n.9 (1973).
36. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
37. H. BENJAMIN, supra note 2, at 8.
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EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
A Suggested Approach
In the usual equal protection case, once the state has created a
classification scheme, it is clear to which category a person belongs.
38
By contrast, when applying to a transsexual a law which classifies by
sex, the state must at the outset determine the category of sex to
which the transsexual belongs. The following paradigm is offered as
an approach to solve the problems this unusual situation creates.
There are two levels of classification created by the state when it
uses the chromosome test to determine a transsexual's sex. At level
one, people are classified by and treated differently on the basis of
their sex. When the chromosome test is used to determine the sex of a
transsexual, a second level of classification is created. At level two,
people are classified by and treated differently on the basis of their
chromosomes.
These two levels of classification are integrally related. The state,
by defining sex according to chromosomes, is treating the two levels
as one. However, chromosomes should not be regarded as determina-
tive of a person's sex. Therefore, the two levels of classification, sex
and chromosomes, should be analyzed separately.
39
A transsexual can assert an equal protection violation at both
levels. At level one the transsexual's claim is that the state cannot
treat men and women differently in a given situation. For example,
level one equal protection challenges have been made, although un-
successfully, in the marriage context, where homosexuals claim that
restricting marriage to members of the opposite sex denies them
equal protection of the law.
4 0
38. For example, in Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976), the classification
was based on illegitimacy. The category is clear: either a person is legitimate or
illegitimate.
39. It must be emphasized that chromosome-based discrimination is not the
same as sex-based discrimination. Because of this difference, cases on sex
discrimination need not be controlling when analyzing chromosome discrimina-
tion. Thus, for example, the fact that sex has not been held a suspect classifica-
tion should not preclude a finding that chromosome makeup is a suspect clas-
sification.
40. Three cases where members of the same sex were prohibited from marry-
ing are James v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn.
310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971); Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187
(19,74). See Note, The Legality of HomosexualMarriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573 (1973).
If a transsexual was successful at level one, there would be no need
to examine a level two equal protection claim. However, if it were
found that the state could discriminate on the basis of sex, the
transsexual may still make a level two equal protection challenge.
The level two claim is that the chromosome test categorizes the
transsexual improperly and is therefore a violation of equal protec-
tion of the law.
Although a successful equal protection challenge at level one will
resolve the problem for the transsexual in a given context, an analy-
sis of the merits of level one challenges is beyond the scope of this
Comment.4 Usually the transsexual whose rights are abridged by the
chromosome test is not questioning the right of the state to classify
by sex. Rather, he is seeking recognition as a member of his new sex.
Therefore, in examining the level two equal protection challenge, this
Comment will assume that the state may validly classify by sex in the
two contexts discussed.
Standard of Review of the Chromosome Test
In determining whether laws or state activities violate the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,42 the United States
Supreme Court applies different standards of review.
The Strict Scrutiny Standard
The most demanding standard of review applied by the Court in
equal protection cases is known as the strict scrutiny test. This test is
41. Level one equal protection challenges have been made in the marriage
and sports contexts. In the marriage context, homosexuals seeking to marry
have argued that the denial of a marriage is an equal protection violation. These
claims have so far been unsuccessful. James v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky.
1973); Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971); Singer v. Hara, 11
Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d f187 (1974). In the sports setting, females at the high
school and college level have argued that depriving them of the right to partici-
pate in boys' sports competition denies them the right to equal protection of the
law. Some of these cases have met with success. E.g., Commonwealth v. Penn-
sylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 18 Pa. Commw. Ct. 45, 334 A.2d 839
(1975), Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975).
The potential significance of the adoption of the proposed equal rights amend-
ment, which would prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex, occurs at level
one. The equal rights amendment would undoubtedly give sex a suspect status.
It would then become very difficult for a state to justify a sex classification
under strict scrutiny. Two examples of this in the sports context are Common-
wealth v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 18 Pa. Commw. Ct. 45,334
A.2d 839 (1975), and Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975). Both
Pennsylvania and Washington had adopted their own equal rights amendment.
In these cases, it was held that the state could not prohibit participation in the
contact sport of football on the basis of sex. Thus, the importance of the equal
rights amendment in the courts' decisions to invalidate the sex-based classifica-
tions involved is apparent.
42. "No state shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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applied when state laws or activities operate to the disadvantage of
suspect classes or interfere with the exercise of fundamental rights.43
A classification will survive strict scrutiny only where it is necessary
to promote a compelling state interest.
44
The chromosome test appears to interfere with a potentially funda-
mental right to marry.45 In Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court
expressed the view that "the freedom to marry has long been recog-
nized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men. '46 In another context, the Court
43. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
44. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972).
45. Arguably, the Supreme Court has recognized the right to marry as funda-
mental. In Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), the Court struck down a statute
that made marriage between a black person and a white person illegal. The
Court applied strict scrutiny to the statute on the ground that it was based on the
suspect classification of race. Therefore, the Court's view on the right to marry,
stated in the text accompanying note 46 infra, is dicta.
In Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), the Court
stated that "marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race." The Court in Skinner struck down a law which
allowed habitual criminals to be sterilized. Strict scrutiny was applied here for
the reason that the law interfered with the fundamental interest of procreation.
Therefore, the Court's view of marriage in Skinner is also dicta.
In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971), the Court said that "mar-
riage involves interests of basic importance in our society." In Boddie, a law
requiring a filing fee of $45 in order to commence divorce proceedings was held
unconstitutional. It prevented the appellants from commencing divorce pro-
ceedings because they were indigent and could not afford the filing fees. The
Court decided the case on the ground that the law denied appellants due process
by denying them access to the courts. Therefore, once again, the Court's view on
the right to marry appears to be dicta.
As demonstrated above, the Court has never held the right to marry, standing
alone, to be fundamental. The right to marry recognized by the Court has been
combined with another right that the Court gives constitutional protection.
Nevertheless, the Court appears to be sensitive to any infringement with the
right to marry. "This Court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice
in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La
Fleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974). Even if the Court did not hold the right to
marry standing alone to be fundamental, it should tie it to other bases of
discrimination in the case of transsexuals, as it did in Loving, Skinner and
Boddie.
The right to marry, discussed in this Comment, encompasses not only the
situation where a transsexual seeks to enter a marriage but also the question of
the validity of an existing marriage involving a transsexual.
46. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). An additional fundamental right abridged by the
chromosome test is that of a transsexual to be legally recognized as a member of
his new sex. This right arguably should be regarded as a fundamental right of
privacy under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. It involves
the decision to live and function in society as a member of his new sex. This
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held that "marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very
existence and survival of the race. ' 47 For this reason, strict scrutiny
should be applied to the chromosome classification in the marriage
setting.
The chromosome classification also requires strict scrutiny if it is
held to be a suspect classification. 48 In Mathews v. Lucas,49 the Court
established three criteria for determining whether a classification is
suspect: that the basis of the discrimination have a pervasive and
severe history of discrimination;50 that it is determined by causes not
within the control of the individual;51 and that it bear no relation to
ability to perform or contribute to society.
52
Technically, the transsexual has not experienced a pervasive his-
tory of discrimination in the sense of suffering many years of mis-
treatment. However, this is most likely because sex reassignment
surgery has been performed in this country only in the last ten
years.53 Many transsexuals whose conditions have become known,
however, have been discriminated against.54 The persistent pattern of
decision is as basic and personal to the transsexual as the pregnant woman's
decision to end her pregnancy, regarded as a fundamental right of privacy in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and a person's decision to use a contraceptive,
similarly protected in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
47. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
48. That the Supreme Court has never held sex to be a suspect classification
should not preclude the Court from finding the chromosome classification to be
suspect. The Supreme Court has held classifications based on race, McLaughlin
v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), national ancestry and ethnic origin, Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81
(1943), and alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), to be suspect.
49. 427 U.S. 495 (1976). The basis of discrimination in Mathews was illegiti-
macy.
50. Id. at 506.
51. Id. at 505.
52. Id.
53. The first sex reassignment operations were performed in this country at
Johns Hopkins Hospital in 1966. Wall St. J., Jan. 28, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
54. An example is Steve Dain, a female to male transsexual living in Emery-
ville, Ca. As a female, known as Doris Richards, she worked as a girl's physical
education teacher at Emery High School. She took a sick leave and later return.
ed as a man, having undergone sex reassignment surgery. Dain was suspended
from his job on October 14, 1976, on grounds of immoral conduct and unfitness.
The Dain story illustrates that the transsexual may experience not only a loss of
employment but also ridicule. Dan has been the butt of many jokes about his
condition. Los Angeles Times, Nov. 27, 1976, § D, at 1. Angela Giveins, a female
transsexual, was made to undress before male deputies following an arrest,
given male clothes, and referred to as an "it." San Diego Evening Tribune, Oct.
15, 1976, § B, at 4, col. 5. For other examples of discrimination against transsexu-
als, see id., Sept. 2, 1976, § E, at 1, col. 1. (transsexual denied hormone tablets
after arrested); id., July 9, 1976, § B, at 9, col. 2. (female transsexual suspended
from truck driver job for refusing to wear men's work clothing); id., Oct. 24,
1975, § A, at 26, col. 5 (pre-operative woman transsexual fired from job after
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severe discrimination against transsexuals, during the period in
which they have become conspicuous, should be sufficient to satisfy
the first criterion of suspectness.
The second Mathews criterion is also satisfied. The chromosome
pattern of an individual is determined by causes not within the
control of the individual. The chromosome pattern of a transsexual is
a result of the type of chromosome that the father's sperm cell carried
when it entered the mother's egg cell at the moment of conception.
55
Finally, the type of chromosomes 6 a person possesses has no rela-
tion to ability to perform or contribute to society. Chromosomes are
only one variable that contribute to determining a person's sex.
Therefore, chromosomes have even less relation to ability to perform
or contribute to society than does sex.
57
The Intermediate Standard
If the Court does not accept chromosome-based classification as
abridging a fundamental right or as suspect, then it would invoke
minimal scrutiny.58 However, while the United States Supreme Court
in some cases claims to be using the rational relationship test, it is
actually applying a more demanding level of scrutiny.59 In his dis-
senting opinion in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rod-
riguez,60 Justice Marshall analyzed various cases in which the Court
telling employer of plans to have sex reassignment surgery); id., Aug. 18, 1971, §
B, at 6, col. 5 (Paula Grossman, elementary school music teacher, dismissed
because a transsexual).
55. See note 9 supra. It could be argued that the transsexual suffers discrimi-
nation after sex reassignment surgery, and having the surgery is something the
transsexual has control over. But in reality it is the condition of transsexualism
that is beyond the control of the transsexual. The transsexual has no more
control over being a transsexual than does a black person over being black.
Having sex reassignment surgery is simply a natural step the transsexual under-
goes in order to bring harmony between his gender and anatomy. It would be
grossly unfair to the transsexual to conclude that the basis of the transsexual's
discrimination is under his control because he could elect not to have sex
reassignment surgery.
56. The use of chromosomes here refers to sex chromosomes.
57. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973), a plurality of four
justices concluded that sex has no relation to ability to perform or contribute to
society.
58. See note 69 and accompanying text infra.
59. See also Gunther, Foreword:In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Chang-
ing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1972).
60. 411 U.S. 1, 98-110 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall has
expressed his dislike of the two-tier approach to equal protection analysis. He
claims that many cases do not properly come under either the rational relation
purported to apply minimal scrutiny but in reality applied a higher
level of scrutiny.6 1 Two factors are prevalent: the individual interest
affected by the classification scheme is fairly basic and the basis of
classification is invidious.6 2
The two factors Justice Marshall identified are actually the same
two factors involved in the Court's decision to apply the strict
scrutiny test. The difference between the use of these factors in the
two instances is one of degree. Thus, although the individual right
abridged by the state may not be a fundamental right, it may be a
basic individual right.63 According to Justice Marshall, in a case
involving such a right, the Supreme Court should apply more than
minimal scrutiny.6 4 Similarly, in cases where a classification has not
been considered suspect but nevertheless involves an invidious basis
for discrimination, the Court should apply more than minimal
scrutiny.
65
The Court should apply an intermediate standard of review rather
than minimal scrutiny66 in a case challenging the chromosome test on
equal protection grounds. Even if the Court does not find the right to
marry or the right to be legally recognized as a member of the new
sex to be fundamental, these rights should be regarded as basic and
personal to the transsexual.6 7 Also, even if the Court rejects the claim
that a chromosome based classification is a suspect classification,
chromosomes are an invidious basis for discrimination.
68
or strict scrutiny test. He advocates the use of an intermediate level of scrutiny
known as the sliding scale approach. Under this approach, "concentration must
be placed upon the character of the classification in question, the relative impor-
tance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the governmental
benefits that they do not receive, and the asserted state interest in support of the
classification." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
61. Cases cited and analyzed by Justice Marshall as representing the applica-
tion of an intermediate level of scrutiny are Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406
U.S. 164 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
62. "lIt seems to me inescapably clear that this Court has consistently adjust-
ed the care with which it will review state discrimination in light of the constitu-
tional significance of the interests affected and the invidiousness of the particu-
lar classification." San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 109 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
63. An example of such a right is "the intimate, familial relationship between
a child and his own mother." Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968). Although
this right is of great importance to the individual, it has nevertheless not been
considered fundamental by the Supreme Court. Id.
64. E.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right of privacy).
65. E.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (illegitimacy).
66. See note 69 and accompanying text infra.
67. See notes 45 & 46 and accompanying text supra.
68. The chromosome classification is invidious for the same reasons that it
should be regarded suspect. See text accompanying notes 45-57 supra.
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The Minimal Scrutiny Standard
The most lenient standard of review is known as the rational
relation test, or minimal scrutiny. Under this test, the classification
will be sustained if it "is rationally related to a legitimate govern-
mental interest."6 9 It will be shown that the chromosome test in the
marriage and birth certificate contexts is unconstitutional under the
minimal scrutiny standard of review; and, because it fails to pass
even this lenient test, it must surely be found unconstitutional under
either strict or intermediate scrutiny.
Marriage
After a transsexual marries, the transsexual's purported spouse
may claim that the existing marriage is void because it is composed
of two people of the same sex.70 In this situation,71 is there a rational
relation between the use of the chromosome test and the state's
interests in using the chromosome test?
The rationality of the chromosome test in light of five state inter-
ests in the chromosome test will be examined here The five state
An example of this intermediate standard of review is the recent Supreme
Court sex discrimination case, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). The Court
stated that "classifications by gender must serve important governmental objec-
fives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Id.
at 197. At least for sex discrimination cases, this test appears to indicate an
intermediate standard of review. Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, states
that,
[a]s has been true of Reed and its progeny, our decision today will be
viewed by some as a "middle-tier" approach. While I would not endorse
that characterization and would not welcome a further subdividing of
equal protection analysis, candor compels the recognition that the rela-
tively deferential "rational basis" standard of review normally applied
takes on a sharper focus when we address a gender-based classification.
Id. at 210 n.* (Powell, J., concurring). This observation is further evidence that
the Court does utilize an intermediate standard of review. Because of the close
relationship between sex discrimination and chromosome discrimination, the
Court might be inclined to apply an intermediate standard of review to chromo-
some discrimination.
69. United States Dep't. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,533 (1973). The
Court is quite deferential to the state when determining whether the rational
relation exists. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
70. E.g., M.T. v. J.T., 140 N.J. Super. 77,355 A.2d 204 (1976); Corbett v. Corbett
(Ashley), [1970] 2 All E.R. 33.
71. Another possible situation in which the chromosome test could be applied
in the marriage context would involve a transsexual who seeks to marry but is
denied the right because according to his chromosome pattern he is of the same
sex as his proposed spouse. There are no cases involving this fact situation
because usually the transsexual is able to marry without the state learning of his
condition.
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interests are the state's interest in opposite sex marriage; the ability
to consummate the marriage; discouraging homosexual conduct;
procreation; and administrative convenience.72
The Rationality of the Chromosome Test in Light of the
State Interest in Opposite Sex Marriage
The state has an interest in opposite sex marriage in the sense that
no state has sanctioned marriage between members of the same sex.
7 3
Given this state interest, the chromosome test is used in the marriage
context to determine the transsexual's sex so that it can be deter-
mined whether the transsexual is of the opposite sex of his purported
spouse. The rationality of the chromosome test in the situation can
thus be reduced to this question: does the chromosome test rationally
determine a transsexual's sex in the marriage context?
Two cases have addressed the question of how to determine
whether a transsexual is a female for the purpose of marriage. In
Corbett v. Corbett (Ashley),74 an English case, the husband of a
female transsexual sought to have their purported marriage declared
null and void. The husband had known that his wife-to-be was a
transsexual at the time of their marriage. The court examined a
wealth of medical information concerning transsexualism and sex
determination. The test used by the court to determine sex in the
context of marriage was the chromosome test. 5 It is not clear why the
court found that the chromosome test was the proper test of sex. The
court simply stated that only a biological female "is naturally capa-
ble of performing the essential role of a woman in marriage." 76 The
only definition of the essential role of a woman in marriage was the
"capacity for natural heterosexual intercourse."' 7
72. The equal protection challenge in the marriage context has not been
made. Most of the state interests examined here are those expressed in cases in
which persons of the same sex seek legal sanction of their marriage. These are
the level one state interests. The level two interests in the chromosome test will
be for the most part the same as the level one state interests in segregating by
sex. The only state interest that applies to level two alone is administrative
convenience. It will be seen that most of the state interests are based on the
assumption that the transsexual is a member of his original sex. Because a
transsexual should not be regarded as a member of his original sex, these state
interests readily break down.
73. While most statutes are silent as to whether marriage must consist of
individuals of the opposite sex, the courts have consistently interpreted statutes
as including that individuals be of the opposite sex as a requirement of mar-
riage. Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn.
310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971); Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187
(1974).
74. [1970] 2 All E.R. 33.
75. The court considered not only chromosomes as determinative of sex but
also considered other biological criteria, such as gonads and genitalia. Id. at 48.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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In M.T. v. JT.,78 a case with facts similar to Corbett, the New
Jersey Supreme Court addressed the question of "how to tell the sex
of a person for marital purposes. '7 9 In M.T., the husband of a female
transsexual refused to pay support and maintenance payments to his
wife on the ground that she was a man and that their marriage was
therefore void. The court here, as in Corbett, examined medical
information regarding transsexualism and sex determination. The
court in M.T., however, rejected the Corbett court's use of the
chromosome test:
Against the backdrop of the evidence in the present record we must
disagree with the conclusion reached in Corbett that for purposes of
marriage sex is somehow irrevocably cast at the moment of birth, and
that for adjudging the capacity to enter marriage, sex in its biological
sense should be the exclusive standard.
80
The court instead used anatomy and gender as the criteria for
determination of sex." Anatomical sex is a function of the genitalia
of an individual, 82 while an individual's gender is "one's self-image,
the deep psychological or emotional sense of sexual identity and
character." 83 The court explained that when a transsexual's anatomy
and gender are in harmony, then these two criteria of sex should
determine the transsexual's overall sex. Where, however, there is
disharmony between a person's anatomy and gender identity, as in
the case of a pre-operative transsexual, then the person's anatomy
should be the controlling factor.
84
In resolving the question of sex determination, 8 the anatomical
and gender test adopted in M.T. is eminently preferable to the
chromosome test adopted in Corbett. As the M.T. court recognized,
there are several criteria which may be relevant to determining the
sex of an individual.8 6 When there is a disharmony between the
various criteria of sex, it becomes necessary to decide which criteria
of sex should be determinative of a person's sex. The condition of
78. 140 N.J. Super. 77, 355 A.2d 204 (1976).
79. Id. at 78, 355 A.2d at 205.
80. Id. at 86, 355 A.2d at 209.
81. Id. at 87, 355 A.2d at 209.
82. Id. at 86, 355 A.2d at 208.
83. Id. at 86, 355 A.2d at 209.
84. Id. at 86-87, 355 A.2d at 209.
85. Although in both cases the transsexual was a post-operative female, it
appears that the test of sex adopted by these two courts would apply as well to a
post-operative male.
86. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
androgen insensitivity87 exemplifies that the criteria of anatomy and
gender should be controlling. The androgen insensitive female phys-
ically appears to be a female and believes herself to be a female.
However, the chromosomal sex of this person is male. It is doubtful
that any doctor or layperson would classify the androgen insensitive
female as a male. Because of a biological inability to react to the
hormone androgen, this person's chromosomal sex is in disharmony
with her other criteria of sex. In such a person, it is irrational to
determine her sex by the chromosome test.
Although transsexualism involves a psychological anomaly of sex-
ual differentiation while androgen insensitivity is biological, the
same criteria of sex should be applied to both.88 The female transsex-
ual, like the androgen insensitive female, has always believed herself
to be female and, following surgery, appears to be female. The only
difference between the two anomalies is that the transsexual origi-
nally appeared to be male. This should not prejudice the conclusion
that the female transsexual is a member of the female sex. The
transsexual's condition, though psychological, nevertheless consists
of a genuine conviction that he is a member of the opposite sex.89 Her
dissonance is no less real or genuine than that of the androgen
insensitive person.
The anomalies of androgen insensitivity and transsexualism illus-
trate that gender and anatomy are the most desirable determinants of
sex. They further illustrate that chromosome pattern does not cor-
rectly indicate the sex of individuals, such as transsexuals who have
disharmony among their various criteria of sex. There is no rational
relation between the chromosome test and the state interest in oppo-
site sex marriage because the chromosome test will not rationally
determine whether the transsexual is of the opposite sex of his pur-
ported spouse.
The Rationality of the Chromosome Test in Light of the
State Interest in the Ability to Consumate the Marriage
A second state interest in the chromosome test is the capacity of the
individual for sexual intercourse. Most states have laws which allow
for annullment if one of the parties is incapable of consummating the
marriage and the other spouse did not know of the sexual incapacity
at the time of marriage. 90 The requirement of knowledge of the
87. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
88. The argument that these two anomalies should be treated identically was
made in Note, Transsexual in Limbo: Search for a Legal Definition of Sex, 31
MD. L. REV. 236, 240 (1971).
89. See notes 23-37 and accompanying text supra.
90. See DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 1551 (1953). However, in California, the statute is
silent as to whether the non-incapacitated spouse need know about the incapaci-
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incapacity is significant. Although ability to consummate is funda-
mental to marriage, when a person knows about his partner's in-
capacity yet is willing to marry that person, then the state will
recognize the marriage as valid. Thus, a person who is incapable of
consummation due to illness or accident is nevertheless given the
state's sanction of marriage, so long as his prospective spouse is
aware of his disability. The state has no interest in not recognizing a
marriage between two people of the opposite sex who willingly mar-
ry despite the sexual incapacity of one of the partners. Therefore, the
state's interest in the capability of consummation has no application
to the transsexual marriage in which the transsexual has informed
his future spouse of his condition.9 1
The Rationality of the Chromosome Test in Light of the
State Interest in Discouraging Homosexual Conduct
A third state interest in the use of the chromosome test in the
marriage context is to discourage homosexual conduct. There are two
reasons why this state interest is not legitimate. First, the transsexual
should be regarded as a member of his new sex.2 Therefore, a mar-
riage between a transsexual and a member of his original sex is
heterosexual rather than homosexual. 93 Second, even if the relation-
ty at the time of marriage. CAL. Crv. CODE § 4425 (West 1970). It would appear
that in California, a marriage could be annulled even if both partners were
aware of the sexual incapacity at the time of marriage. This fact would leave a
sexually incapacitated spouse in a precarious position because the non-in-
capacitated partner could void the marriage at any time.
In a jurisdiction such as California, the sexual capacity of the transsexual
becomes significant in terms of whether the marriage is valid. Although the
prevailing medical view, and the view taken in M.T., is that a female transsexual
can function satisfactorily sexually, the male transsexual is impotent. See M.T.
v. J.T., 140 N.J. Super. 77, 355 A.2d 204 (1976), and note 33 supra. It would seem,
therefore, that in a jurisdiction with a California-type statute, the male transsex-
ual marriage might be annulled at any time.
91. The discussion here assumes that the transsexual's condition is known to
his spouse. If the transsexual's condition was not known to his spouse at the
time of marriage, then questions of fraud and sexual incapacity would arise.
It appears that the Corbett and M.T. courts may have considered the incapac-
ity of the individual for sexual intercourse to be a criterion of sex. If they did,
this was improper. Sexual capacity should be and is considered in determining
whether a marriage is valid. However, if sexual capacity is used as a test of sex
for marital purposes, then a man who is made impotent by an accident would no
longer be a man for the purpose of marriage. This is clearly an unacceptable
result.
92. See text accompanying notes 85-89, supra.
93. The transsexual, whether pre-operative or post-operative, does not con-
sider himself homosexual. Regardless of what sex others consider him to be, he
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ship is regarded as homosexual, there is no evidence that prohibiting
the marriage will discourage the purportedly homosexual conduct.
The transsexual, if not allowed to marry, would undoubtedly con-
tinue his relationship even though the state will not give legal sanc-
tion to it.
The Rationality of the Chromosome Test in Light of the
State Interest in Procreation
A fourth state interest in the chromosome test in the marriage
context is procreation. Traditionally, procreation and the rearing of
children is a product of the institution of marriage. However, it does
not follow that two persons of the opposite sex who cannot procre-
ate94 should not be allowed to enter a valid marriage. 95 Clearly, this
proposition is not the state of the law. Inability to procreate is not a
ground for annullment.95 This fact is true even where one spouse did
not know of the other spouse's sterility at the time of marriage.
97
Thus, the state has no interest in not allowing a transsexual to marry
because the transsexual cannot bear children. It is irrational for the
state to do so in the case of the transsexual when it does not deny the
right to marry to other persons who are unable or unwilling to
procreate.
The Rationality of the Chromosome Test in Light of the
State Interest in Administrative Convenience
A final state interest in the chromosome test is its administrative
convenience. The chromosome test 98 is considered a fairly simple
procedure from a medical viewpoint. However, the proposed gender-
anatomy test is not significantly more difficult to administer. A
transsexual's anatomy can be quickly checked by simple observa-
tion.99 As to gender, the transsexual could simply obtain a certificate
believes that his relationships are heterosexual. Pauly, Adult Manifestations of
Male Transsexualism, in Green & Money, supra note 2, at 58.
94. The transsexual is sterile. Green & Money, supra note 2, at 284.
95. This discussion assumes that a transsexual is of the opposite sex of his
spouse.
96. If the begetting of children were the chief end of marriage, it should
follow that our public policy would favor annulling marriage in sterility
cases where the fact of sterility is unknown to the parties at the time of
the marriage. But no statute in this state permits annullment in such
cases.
T. v. M., 100 N.J. Super. 530, 538, 242 A.2d 670, 674-75 (1968).
97. Id. Consummation, discussed in the text accompanying notes 90 & 91
supra, refers to the ability to engage in sexual intercourse. Sterility refers to the
inability to produce offspring. Id.
98. See note 9 supra.
99. Where a dispute over a transsexual's sex arises in a judicial proceeding, as
in the M.T. situation, the court could appoint a doctor to examine the transsexu-
al's anatomy to determine if it is consistent with the transsexual's sex. If an
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from his doctor or from the gender identity clinic which treated him
stating the transsexual's gender.100 Yet, even if the chromosome test
is found to be the most administratively convenient test of sex, the
Supreme Court has said that "although efficacious administration of
governmental programs is not without some importance, the 'Con-
stitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.' ",101
The chromosome test cannot withstand the rational relation test in
light of any of the five state interests examined. A fortiori, it can
withstand neither the strict scrutiny standard of review nor an inter-
mediate standard of review. The chromosome test is an unconstitu-
tional denial of a transsexual's right to equal protection of the law




There have been a few cases in which a transsexual has sought a
birth certificate amendment. 0 3 None has involved an equal protec-
administrative procedure is involved, as where the transsexual applies for a
marriage license, the administrative agency could also appoint a doctor to
examine the transsexual's anatomy.
100. The doctor or gender identity clinic that treats a transsexual insures that
the transsexual's gender is truly that of his new sex before allowing the trans-
sexual to undergo sex reassignment surgery. See note 30 supra and text accom-
panying notes 29-32 supra. Therefore, they are well qualified to ascertain the
transsexual's gender.
101. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973).
102. The discussion here will assume that the transsexual is denied the birth
certificate amendment of sex designation because of a determination of his sex.
Each state has laws which explain the procedures for amending a birth certifi-
cate and tell who is eligible for a birth certificate amendment. Most states allow
the birth certificate amendment if there has been an error on the original birth
certificate, after a change in parentage due to adoption, after legitimation, or
after parental change of name. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 10430-
10439.5, §§ 10440-10448, §§ 10460-10462 (West 1975).
It is possible that the state administrative agency could deny the amendment
to the transsexual on the ground that the transsexual does not fall within any of
the statutory categories that are eligible for the amendment. Only one of the
cases listed in note 103 infra that denied the birth certificate change did so on
this ground. In such a case, the transsexual would appear not to have an equal
protection claim.
Some states currently explicitly allow by statute for a birth certificate amend-
ment in the case of a sex change. Three of these are Illinois, Louisiana and
Arizona. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-326 (Supp. 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 1112, § 73-17
(Smith-Hurd 1966); LA. REV. STAT. Am. § 40:61 (West 1977). See Comment, The
Law and Transsexualism: A Faltering Response to a Conceptual Dilemma, 7
CONN. L. REV. 288, 301 (1975).
103. Darnell v. Lloyd, 395 F. Supp. 1210 (D.C. Conn. 1975); Hartinv. Director of
Bureau of Records & Statistics, 75 Misc. 2d 229, 347 N.Y.S. 2d 515 (1973); In re
351
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tion challenge to the denial of the birth certificate amendment based
on the chromosome test.0 4 As a result, no court has examined the
state interests in denying the amendment. Nevertheless, in Anony-
mous v. Weiner,"5 three state interests in not allowing the birth
certificate amendment were set forth. These three interests will be
considered as possible state interests in the chromosome test in the
birth certificate context. A fourth state interest, not considered in
Weiner, will also be examined.
The Rationality of the Chromosome Test in Light of the
State Interest in Accuracy of Public Records
One state interest in applying the chromosome test in the birth
certificate context is the state's obligation to insure the accuracy of
public records. 106 This interest assumes that chromosomes determine
the sex of a transsexual. The court in Weiner reasoned that because
the transsexual is a member of his original sex, as evidenced by the
chromosome test, it would be inaccurate to designate him by his new
sex on his birth certificate. However, according to the more rational
gender-anatomy test of sex, 0 7 the transsexual ought to be regarded
as a member of his new sex. When the transsexual uses his birth
certificate in society,0 8 such use will be inconsistent with the trans-
sexual's sex if it designates him as his original sex. Because the
chromosome test will require an inaccurate designation of the trans-
sexual's sex on his birth certificate, there is no rational relation
between the chromosome test and the state interest in the accuracy of
public records.
The Rationality of the Chromosome Test in Light of the
State Interest in Preventing Fraud
A second state interest is the protection against fraud.10 9 This
Anonymous, 57 Misc. 2d 813, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1968); K. v. Department of Hu-
man Resources, 26 Or. App. 311, 552 P.2d 840 (1976).
104. In a fairly recent case, Darnell v. Lloyd, 395 F. Supp. 1210 (D. Conn.
1975), a transsexual who was denied a birth certificate amendment did claim
that her right to equal protection of the law was violated. This claim apparently
was not based on the test used by the Board of Health to determine the transsex-
ual's sex. Rather, the transsexual claimed that others similarly situated had
been allowed a birth certificate amendment.
105. 50 Misc. 2d 380, 382, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319, 321 (1966). In Weiner, a male to
female transsexual sought to have the sex designation on her birth certificate
amended.
106. Anonymous v. Weiner, 50 Misc. 2d 380,382,270 N.Y.S. 2d 319,321 (1966). "It
is obvious that the purpose of a birth certificate is to accurately set forth the
information which by law it is required to contain." K. v. Department of Human
Resources, 26 Or. App. 311, 314-15, 552 P.2d 840, 843-44 (1976).
107. See notes 85-89 and accompanying text supra.
108. Common uses of a birth certificate are to obtain marriage licenses and
passports.
109. Anonymous v. Weiner, 50 Misc. 2d 380, 383, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319, 322 (1966).
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interest also assumes that chromosomes determine a transsexual's
sex. The theory here is that the transsexual is misrepresenting him-
self if his birth certificate designates him as his new sex. Once again,
however, the transsexual should be regarded as a member of his new
sex according to the more rational gender-anatomy test of sex.
Therefore, it is not a fraud for a transsexual's birth certificate to
represent him as a member of his new sex. As a later decision criticiz-
ing Weiner noted, it is a greater fraud for a transsexual to have his
original sex on his birth certificate than to have his new sex on it. 110
The Rationality of the Chromosome Test in Light of the
State Interest in Using Public Records to Aid the Psy-
chologically Ill
The third state interest set forth in Weiner is the need to prevent
laws and records, such as birth certificates, from being used "as a
means to help psychologically ill persons in their social adapta-
tion.""' This state interest was based on the conclusion of the New
York Academy of Medicine. The Academy had been requested by the
board of health to make a report on the advisability of a birth
certificate amendment in the case of a transsexual." 2 This line of
reasoning shows a blatant misunderstanding of transsexualism. Most
experts in transsexualism agree that the only treatment that can
substantially help the transsexual is sex reassignment surgery and
the proper accompanying procedures. 113 Once the state recognizes
the necessity and validity of the sex reassignment procedure, it fol-
lows that the state has no interest in forbidding the transsexual to
use the law to help the transsexual to fully effectuate his sex reas-
signment.
The Rationality of the Chromosome Test in Light of the
State Interest in the Birth Certificate Reflecting Facts at
the Time of Birth
A final state interest in not allowing a transsexual to amend the sex
designation on his birth certificate was expressed by the dissent in a
recent case which, unlike Weiner, allowed the transsexual to have his
110. In re Anonymous, 57 Misc. 2d 813, 817, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834, 838 (1968).
111. Anonymous v. Weiner, 50 Misc. 2d 380, 382, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319, 322 (1966).
112. The committee examining the question consisted of gynecologists, en-
docrinologists, cytogeneticists, a psychiatrist and an attorney. Id.
113. See Hastings, The Surgical Route, 9 INT'L J. PSYCH. 273, 274 (1970-71).
birth certificate amended' 4 The dissent argued that the birth cer-
tificate is to be a record of certain facts about an individual at the
time of birth. According to this view, even if the state were to recog-
nize that the legal sex of a transsexual has changed since birth, the
birth certificate should not be amended because the designation of
the transsexual as his original sex would in that case be accurate as
of the time of his birth. This view ignores the many other instances in
which a birth certificate amendment is allowed even though the
amended birth certificate no longer conforms to the individual's
status at the time of birth. Most states have statutes allowing for a
birth certificate amendment to reflect that an individual has been
adopted, legitimated, or that his parents' name has been changed." 5
It would appear, therefore, that the state interest in birth certificates
is not in recording facts as of the time of birth, but instead in
recording facts as they presently exist.
Thus, there is no rational relation between the chromosome test
and any of the four state interests in using it in the birth certificate
context. It follows that the chromosome test could not survive the
strict or intermediate standards of scrutiny in this context. There-
fore, it is a violation of a transsexual's constitutional right to equal
protection of the laws to deny him a sex designation amendment on
his birth certificate on the basis of the chromosome test.
A POSSiBLE ALTERNATIVE
If the Court does not accept the argument that the chromosome
classification is unconstitutional, it is still possible to minimize the
damage that results from its use. There is an unfortunate but inevit-
able result when the chromosome test is utilized. The result is that
the overall sex of the transsexual is adjudicated. For example, in the
marriage context, the state holds that only a female can marry a
male. This is the level one classification. At level two, the state holds
that only persons with XX chromosomes are female, so that an XY
female transsexual is not a female and cannot marry a male. This
adjudication of the transsexual's overall sex should be avoided.
The solution is to merge the two levels of classification into one in
those situations in which the state wishes to discriminate on the basis
of chromosomes. Thus, the law in the marriage context would state
that only chromosomal females can marry chromosomal males. The
114. K. v. Department of Human Resources, 26 Or. App. 311, 316-17, 552 P.2d
840, 845-46 (1976) (dissenting opinion).
115. E.g., CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §§ 10430-10439.5, §§ 10440-10448, §§
10460-10462 (West 1975). There does not appear to be any reason to allow a birth
certificate amendment in the case of adoption or legitimacy but not in the case
of sex reassignment.
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result would be the same for the female transsexual in the sense that
she would still be prohibited from marrying a male. However, at least
the law would not be determining the overall sex of the transsexual.
It would instead be adjudicating only the chromosomal sex of the
transsexual. This adjudication would imply a recognition that of the
many criteria that determine sex, only one is chromosomes.
CONCLUSION
In both the marriage and birth certificate contexts, using the
chromosome test to determine a transsexual's sex violates his right to
equal protection of the law. There is no rational relation between the
chromosome test and any state interest in these two contexts.
The courts should therefore reject the chromosome test and instead
adopt the gender-anatomy test of sex. The latter test is a fair test of
sex for those persons whose criteria of sex are in disharmony, be-
cause it is based on the two criteria of sex that are most relevant to a
determination of a person's overall sex.
If courts are unwilling to hold the chromosome test unconstitution-
al, then they should merge the two levels of classification, sex and
chromosomes, into one level, chromosomes. In this way the law
would not determine the overall sex of the transsexual, and would
recognize that chromosome pattern is only one of many criteria that
determine a person's sex.
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